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In .the $upreme Court of the State 
VZtAAR W S O M ,  as trustee of the VILAXiR 
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 1 
V. 1 '  














TOPAZ MARKEimG, L.P., and MR. and 
) 
M R S ,  D E m  LOWJE3, 1 
1 
Defendants-AppdI ants. 
A Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record was filed February 15,2006, in appeaI 
No. 32 146, Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P.; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEZZEBY IS OWER3ED that the Appeal Record in th is case shall b.e 
AUG-NTED to include the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record .Elled in pxJor appeal 
IT FUlU"r'ER IS CRD'EmD that the District Cam Clerk ghdl prepare and file a 
LMJTED CLERK'S RECORD with t h i s  Court, which shall contain the documen% requested in 
the Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not ,duplicate my riucument 
included in the Clerk's R~oord filed in prior appeal No, 32146. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDE'R1JR that the Disttict Court Repoder shall prepare and 
lodge a SUPfZ'fSMENTm RBPORTER'S T W S C W T  with the District Court, whicb shall 
contain the proceedings requested in the Notice: of Appeal, but shall not duplicate any 
proceedings included in the Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 32146. The 
LIMITED CLERK'S Rl5CQR-D and REPOWER'S T W S C W T  shall be filed with this Court 
I 4  - 
AUG. 2 2 .  2008 12 : 30PM I D A ' ' .  CUPREME COURT NO, 4855 P. 3 
aftm settlement. M a ,  the exGbits submitted in prior appeal Nb. 32146, which were returned 
to Pistricr; COW on March 27, 2007, *%axe not covered by this Order and they will n0.t be sent to 
the Supreme Court unless specifically requested by the parties. The party requesting any or all  
of the prior exhibits must specifically designate those exhibits being requested. 
DATED this 16& day of July 2008 ,. 
Pop. the Supreme .Court 
Dorothy ~ e a p e p u t y  Clerk for 
Stephen W. yon7 Clerk 
cc: Counsel ofRecord 
District Court- Clerk 
Disbjct Court Reporter 
Kenneth E.. Lyon, Jr. 
A t t o r n e y  a t  Law 
P.  0.  Box 4866 
P o c a t e l l o ,  I D  83205 
(208) 233-1240 
A t t o r n e y  for Defendant 
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V i l a r r  Ransom, as T r u s t e e  
O f  t h e  Vilarr 3 .  Ransom 
Revocable T r u s t  
P l a i n t i f f ,  
Topaz Market ing,  L . P . ,  and, 
Dennis  Lower, 
Defendants .  
Farr West Inves tments ,  







MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
1 
i 
Topaz Marketing,  L . P . ,  f 













COMES NOW the defendants, by and th rough  ' t h e i r  attorney, 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. and pursuant t o  ~ u l e '  4O,(d) (I), Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure,  moves t h e  Cour t  for  an O ~ d e r  D i s q u a l i f y i n g  the 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 1 
Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, in the above entitled 
matter. 
Dated this 3rd day of January, 2007. 
Attorney for Defe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of January, 2007, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY to the following by placing the same in the 
.U. S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon: 
F. Randall Kline @ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED ( ) Express Mail 
427 N. Main Street, Ste. L ( ) Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 397 ( ) Fax 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397 
Judge Don L. Harding j3a U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Resident Chambers ( ) Express Mail 
159 S. Main ( ) Hand Delivery 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 ( ) Fax 
By: 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY - 2 
F. Randall Mine (ISB#2787) 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
427 N. Main Street, Ste. L 
P.O. Box 397 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397 
Telephone: (208) 232-9007 
Facsimile: (208) 234-4654 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
) CASENO. CV-03-240 





1 AMENDED OBJECTION TO 
1 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
TOPAZ MARKETING LP, ET AL. 1 
Defendants, 1 
1 
) CASE NO. CV-03-239 
VEARR RANSOM, as trustee of the 




TOPAZ MARKETING LP, ET AL. 1 
Defendants. 
) 
AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY Page 1 
COMES NOW Farr West Investments through their attorney of record, F. Randall Kline 
of F. Randall Nine, Chartered, and hereby objects to Motion to Disqualify submitted by the 
Defendants on January 3,2007. 
It is submitted that subsection F of Rule 40 (d)(l) i s  not applicable based on the remand 
for additional findings. See Liebelt v. Liebelt, I25 Idaho 302, 870 P.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994). After 
reviewing Jones v. State, it appears that the head note contained in the annotated portion bf the 
I.R.C.P. is incorrect, see attached Exhibit A. The actual case is the case fotlowing Jones, which is 
Liebelt v. Liebe,  12.5 Idaho 302, 870 P. 2d 9 (Cf. App. 1994). The Liebelt case addresses Rule 
IT IS THEREFORE respecthll y ssubml tted that Judge Harding should not be disqualified 
in the above-entitled matter based upon the remand far addition findings submitted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
DATED this 26th day of April, 2007. 
/ 
CHARTERED 
AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTFY that on the 26th day of April, 2007; 1 served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) listed below, postage prepaid thereon, in the 
manner indicated below: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney At Law 
P.O. Box 4866 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
U.S. Mail 
Express Mail 
X Rand Delivery 
Fax 
Honorable Don L. Harding U.S. Mail 
Resident Chambers Express Mail 
CARTlBOU COUNTY COURTHOUSE X Hand Delivery 
159 S. Main Fax 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
AMENDED OBJECTION TO MOTION TO DISQUALIFY Page 3 
IDAHO COURT RULES 
Grounds. 
Name of Judge. be understood as founded upon his view that 
Post-Conviction Relief. 
W h e r e  petition for post-conviction relief Review ofAgsncy Decisions. 
was never actually served with ~iot ice  of a Subsection ( I , ( i i o f th i s  rule, precluding the 
hearing - 8% i s  expressly contemplated by disqualification without  cause of a judge si t-  
the rules - u n t i l  after his motion for. change ting in an appcitate capacity, is applicable to 
ofjl.idge was filed, his in-custody, uncounselcd district judges conducting judicial review of 
appearance before the court was not a proper state o r  local agency actions urrder thcridmin- 
suhstitilte for the service requ i red  by the istrntive Prucetiutus Act. Arthur v. Sl~oshunr 
rulcs: tt~ererorc, i t  ivould not have been County, 133 Idaho 851,993 P.2d 617 (Ct .  'APP. 
proper for the ctju1.t to ticlly his motion for  a 2000). 
324 
Jones that Flaten had already m d e  an at- seek suppression of a confession to the 
tempt to arrest Jones a t  his residence. charged crime. Therefore, Jones' evidence 
Jones initially refused to make a statement, on both elements of the two-part test for 
Although Jones had thus invoked his right to ineffective assistance of counsel enunciated in' 
remain silent, Flaten continued to questioh Strickland v. Washington, 456 U.S. 668, 
him. Jones relented and gave a statement- S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (19&1), is SUE- 
ocly after Flaten said Jones would be arrest- cient to preclude sumrnzq dismissal of his 
ed if he did not "help" Flaten. After Jones claim, 
was significantly restrained and that he was tion, 
not free to leave. 
The majority relies upon the fact that 
Jones went to the police station volunta~ily 
and that after making his statement he was. 
aliowd to leave. While those facts are rele- 
vant, they are not determinative. See, e.g. 
Unitecl States v. DiGinco.nto, sztpn; State v. 870 ~ . 2 d  9 
Z~>~~tit lsl ie,  804 5.W.2d 851 (Mo.Ct.App. Carol hI. LIEBELT, Plaintiff- 
1991); People zv. Horn, 790 P.2d 816 (Colo. Respondent, 
. 1990). The Miraadn doctrine addresses cir- 
cumstances where pressures exerted by the 
police impail* a detainee's abiiity to exercise Kenneth H. LIEBELT, Defendant- 
his privilege against self-inelimination. Bey- 
kentel; 468 U.S. a t  481, 104 S.Ct. at 3148. KO. 2 0 1 i l .  
Therefore, the psimury focus must be upon 
the reasonabIe state of mind of the individual Coicrt of Appeals of Itial~rj. 
when the incriminating statement was giv- 
March 3 ,  1994. 
en-not on wllat happened before the ques- 
tioning began or after it was concluded. 
If a police interrogation were conducted as 
Further, the evldence js sufficient to raise a County, H. Reynold George, J., adopted 
factual issue as td whether Jones' defense magistrate's findings of Fact and affirmed 
LIEBELT v, LIEBELT 
Cfteas 125 Idaho 302 (App,) 
mnciu~ions of law. Appeals were taken. 5. Appeal and Error  -964 
The Court of Appeals, 118 Idaho 845, 801 Denial of motion to disqualify judge or 
p ~ d  $2, reversed in part and remanded. On magistrate for cause b reviewed under abuse 
magistrate found volunta1.~ ababan- of discretion standard. 
donment of agreement and reaffrmed divi- 
6. Judges e 4 9 ( 1 )  sion of property. Former husband appealed. 
The District Court, Mawin M. Smith, J., Adverse rulings in case do not disqualify 
magistrate's decision, Former bus- judge; in order to be ground for disqualifica- 
band appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wal- tion, bias must stem from judge forming 
ters, C.J., held that: (I) recusai of magistrate opinion on merits of case on some basis other 
for cause was unnecessary; (2) evidence es- than what has been learned from presiding 
*blished voluntary abandonment of prenup- Over it. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 40(d)(2). 
?main to be prov- , : ,, tiaI agveement; . and 13) abandonment issue 7- Husband and Wife e33 
?tent evidence, he ,VS tried by implied consent of parties. 
hearing where he 
Evidence in dit-orce case established 
Affimed. abandonment of prenuptial agseement by not 
h proof. Accord- following it during marriage; contrary to 
istrict court's or- requirements of agreement, heither husband 
Jones' application I. Appeal and Error *1082(1), 1 0 9 W  nor \@fe signed or delivered papers to trans- 
~ n d  remand this 
k g  to determine tt%ere issues before Court of Appeals 
fer ownership of separate propel%y or to 
are same as  those considered by district show joint ownership of it, appointed apprais- rg statement was 
tout sitting in appellate capacity, court  of er  a t  time of separation, or sought to divide M i ~ a n d u  Tights 
ctolxey was defi- Appeals will review trial record with due 
property in manner prmided in agreement, 
regard for, but independently from, district and husband unilaterally cancelled stock pur- suppression mo- 
court's decision and will defer to findings of chase plan and investment plan contrary to 
fact which are based. on substantial, although aseement.  
conflicting, eb-idence. 8. Husband and Wife -33 
7J 1 2. Aooeal and Error bSlj  Husband and d f e  understood or should * .  
have understood that evidence at divorce tri- I n e n  esercise of discretion is reviewed 
a1 concernjng noncompliance uith prenuptiai on appeal, Cowt of Appeals inquires (1) 
whether iower court rightly perceived issue agreement v a s  aimed at issue of abandon- 
&? one of discretion; (2) whether court acted ment; wife's trial brief alLgued that abandon- 
Plaintiff- ~ithin bounclaries of such discretion and con- ment by consent coulcl be impiiecl from acts 
of parties or inconsistent acts. Rules Civ. , sistently nith any legal standarcls applicable 
specific choices; and (3) whether court Proc., Rule I5(b). 
reached tlecision by exercise of reason. 
, Defendant- 9. Cohstitutionai Lair;, -314 
Exercising clisclbetion to clecicle whether 
3. Justices of the Peace *57(fJ 
issue was tried hy implied consent of parties 
''ille P'antiW right to clistjualif~ judge ,nust be consistel-it nith due pl.ocess require- 
Or m;11:istr,ale nithout cause if new trial h ~ s  that pal.tjes heye s l r ~ ~ j c i e n ~  of t' Idaho. 
Ol-dered does not apply to remapd for issues before oppoitunit)- to ad. 
limiird ])lLl.gOSe of having madstrate make dress those issues iljth and argu- 
a d ( i i t i ~ ~ ~ ~ l  \t-riiien findings on particular is- ment. Rules Cir,proc., Rule 15(b); K.S.C.A. 
.wes of fact which have already been tried. ~ ~ ~ ~ t . ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ,  5, 14. 
tl cl~ailenge,.ed va- civ.Proc,, Rule 4O(d)(X)(F). 
:it. F'sed Snook $0. Constitu tionaI Lax -811) 
Introduction of evidence relevant to is- 
Bias or. pr-ejrrdice warranting recusal for sue nqt raised by pleadings does not satisfy 
QUse \VaS not demonstrated by magistrate's due process requirement of notice of issues 
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Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(b); U.S.C.A.. Const, parties began litigating the enforceabjli 
Amends. 5, 14. that agreement. At trial, the magis 
XI. Pleading @=310 
held that the agreement was void and d 
the parties' assets under state law. Ken 
court may not base decision On appealed, contending that the agreement 
m~leaded issue where nothing in in- M d  and enforceable, and alternatively, 
Rules Civ.v.Proc., Rule 15Cb). 
12. Divorce *I86 
port such findings; although Court of Ap- When remanding the case, we stated: 
agreement, it merely observed limited role in ries was argued at trial.. The record do 
reviewing factual issues. not clearly indicate whether the parti 
13. Divorce -286181 
Where magistrate has set out to achieve tract. . .. w e  r a n h d  
equality in property division, divorce decree it is within its discretion to 
upon substantial, albeit conflicting, evidence should be supplemented, in order to rn 
that parties have received substantially equal the required findings of fact and con 
shares. I.C. $ 32-712. 
trial. court determines that the agre 
was valid, the court is directed to 
John Ohman argued. the parties7 intentions as governed by th 
Edward W. Pike and Todd R. Erikson, prenuptial agreement. 
Idaho Falls, for respondent, Todd R. Erik- 
Id., at  849, 801 P.2d at  56. 
Kenneth subsequently Bed a motion to 
WALTERS, Chief Judge. disqualify the magistrate, who had presided 
This is an appeal following a remand for over the originaltrial from deciding the is- 
supplemental findings in a divorce action. sues on remand. The magistrate denied 
ks in the fist apped, the cerltral issue con- motion. Based upon the exmisting evidentiw 
cerns the magistrate's decision to set aside record, and after considering the written and 
the parties' prenuptial. agreement. Based 
upon the magistrate's supplemental findings, 
we now affirm the magistrate's divorce de- 
cree. In so doing, we also uphold the magis- 
trate's division of the parties' property, an 
issue raised but not reviewed in the earlier 
appeal. 
Facts and Procedural Background. 
Carol and Kenneth Liebelt entered into a 
prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage 
in 1986. Upori their divorce in 1987, the 
oral arguments of counsel, the magistrate 
issued supplemental findings and conclusions. 
He held that the parties had not litigated the 
issue of rescission, but that the theory of 
abandonment had been tried by their implicit 
consent. Re then found that the parties had 
voluntarily abandoned the agreement and re- 
affirmed his division of the p e i e s '  prope~%Y. 
Kenneth appealed to the district coW6 
which, sitting in its appellate capacity, upheld 
the magistrate's decision. This apped fol- 
lowed. 
LIEBELT v. LIEBELT 
Clte as 125 Idaho 302 (App.) 
Issues on Appeal. I. The magistrate correctly declined to 
recuse himself from the proceedings 
this appeal, Kenneth raises the folaw- on remand. 
131 We first consider Kenneth's threshold 
1. Did the magistrate em in declining to clGm that the have re- 
recuse himself from the proceedings on ' ,used himself fmm deciding the issues on 
remand. Kenneth asserts that the remand 
2, Did the magistrate err in finding that ordered by this Court triggered his right 
the parties had in fact abandoned their under L.R.C.P. 40(dl(l) to disqualify the mag- 
istrate upon request. Re relies on subsec- 
tion (F) of that rule which grznts to each 
onrnent or ': 3. Did the magistrate err in finding that party the right, upon a timely motion, to 
the theory of "~~andonmen t"  had been disqualify one dish.ict judge or 
tried by consent of the parties? without cause where a "r-ierv trial has been 
ated: 
the record >: 
:hese theo- " 
,ecord does . 
:he parties 
n the con- '. 
, court that 
determine 
ufficient, or 
!er to make : 
- ,  
2nd conclu- 
e event the 
agreement 
,C] to  divide 
rclance with 
rned by the 
motion to 
:~ i l  presidecl 
ding the is- 
? clenied the 





ie theory of 
[heir itnpIicit 
! parties had . 
I 4. Did the magistrate err in dividing the 
I parties' property? 
Standard of Review. 
[I, 21 Where, as here, the issues before 
us are the same as those considered by the 
district cowt sitting in an appellate capacity, 
we ~vill review the trial record with due 
regard for, but independently from, the dis- 
trict court's decision. Liebelt 1, 118 Idaho a t  
8J7, 801 P.2d at 54. We will defer to find- 
ings of fact which are  based on substantial, 
although conflicting, evidence. Id. The trial 
court's discretionary decisions will be upheld 
absent a showing that  the court abused its 
discretion. See Bell zt. Be& 122 Idaho 520, 
83.5 P.2d 1331 (Ct.App.1992). When an exer- 
cise of discretion is ~eviewed on appeal, we 
inquire (1) whether the lower court rightly 
pcrqceiveil the issue as one of discretion; 12) 
l v h ~ t h e r  the court acted within the bound- 
:uies of such discretion and consistently nith 
legal standwds applicable to specific 
choices; anc1 (3) 11-hether the court reached 
its< ciecision by an esercise of reason. 5'11)~ 
~'~jllr!j Siropping Cejlter, 1 ) ~ .  v. Idaho Po~cer. 
('',-. I19 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(iIJ!fl).  It'ith respect tri the trial court's con- 
clusions of lair, bho~vevez+, we exercise free 
rccie\t.. Liebelt 1, 118 Idaho at 841, 801 P.2d 
a\ 9+ 
ordered." I.R.C.P, 40(d)[l)(F), However, 
we did not remand the case for a "new trial." 
As our opinion makes clear, we remanded the 
case for the limited purpose of having the 
magistrate make additional mi t ten  findings 
on particular issues of fact which had already 
been tried before him. Accordingly, Rule 
40(d)(l)(F) did not apply to @.ant Kenneth an 
automatic right to disqualify the magistrate ' 
without cause. 
Furthermolt, Kenneth's motion to disquai- 
ify withaut cause appears to have been un- 
timely under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B).' The mo- 
tion was docketed on March 14, 1991, more 
than twenty-one aays after this Court filed 
the remittitur ordeling the remand, and 
more than seven days after the magistlate's 
order for scheduling. Therefore, the motion 
to disqualify without cause was p~operly de- 
nied on tlre additional ground that it xvas 
untimely. 
[a-61 Kenneth also contencls that the 
magistrate was biased 01- pr-ejudiced against 
him personally and should ha1.e recused him- 
self "for cause" under I.R.C.P. 40(df(I?). The 
denial of a motion to disqualify for cause is 
revietved under an abuse of discretion stall- 
dard. Bell V. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 835 P.2d 
1331 (Ct.App.1992). Kenneth argues that 
the magistrate exceedeil the botrndaries of 
his discretion by failing ta find, under the 
' b  Tkc Rutc provides: ceipt of a complaint, summons, order or othcr 
nlotiwtr for disqualification without cause pleading indicating or specifying who the prc- 
must bc filed not later than seven (7) days after siding judge or mngistratc to ~ i t c  action will be. 
Ijcr~icc of a writtea nolice or order setting the E.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)(B). The rcrnittilur ordcrin:: the 
action For status conference, trial or for hear- casc remandcd was filed December 15. 1990; 
lng on the first contested motion, or not iater the magistrate's subsequent ordcr for scheduling 
than iwcnp-one 121) days after service or re- on remand was dated January 29. 1991. 
125 IDAHO REPORTS 
.applicable legal standard, that he was biased proceedings. He further found that heither 
and prejudiced. See X,R.C,P. 40(d)(Z)(A)(4). party had objected to the other's noncompli- ' 
Kenneth maintains that bias is clearly dem- ance, and that, accordingly, the parties had 
onstrated by the record of the Md proceed- voluntarily abandoned the agreement. Dis- 
ings in which the magistrate issued a con- puting these findings, Kenneth denies he i ~ .  
tempt order and 'awarded attorney fees tended to  bando on the prenuptial agreement, : 
tion, must  stem from the judge forming an their agreement. 
opinion on the merits of the case on some 
basis other than what has been learned from 
presiding over the case, See e,y., United strates that the prenuptial agreement rvas .% 
States v. G?innell Co?.p., 384 U.S. 563, 86 
S.Ct, 1698, 16 L.Ed.Zd 778 (1966); Rosen v. 
Sziyarina?~, 357 F.2d 794 (2nd Cir.1966). 
doned their prenuptial agreement. 
stated in LdebeIt I: 
A contract is abandoned where the acts of We conclude that the evidence of the par- 
one are liith the exis- ties' concluct was sufficient to enable the 
tence of the contl-act and are accluiesced in magistrate to infer that the parties hati aban- 
by the other party. AbanGonment of the doned their aneement. Because substantial 
contract is a question of intent. Such in- evidence supports the magi;istt.ilte's fincling, 
tent can be shoirn by cot~esponding con- n-e nil1 not disturb that finding on al)peal, 
duct a s  demonstrated by surrounding facts 
donment may be implied from the parties' 
actions. "abandonment" had been tried by con. . 
sent  of the parties. 118 Idaho at  849, 801 P.2~1 at 56 {citations 
By its supplemental findings, the magis- that the magistlate erred in using the theo!?' , 
trate found that the prenuptial agreement of abandonment-a theory not raked in the , 
was not put in place by either df the parties' pleadings-to set aside the prenuptial W e p  
during their marriage, and that they had not rnent. In the suppiemental finclings isWd '. 
LIEBELT v, LIEBELT 
Ctteas I25 Idaho 502 (App.) 
ties had implicitky consented to litigate the Idaho at. 849, 801 P.2d a t  56, the magistrate 
\;sue of abandonment.. Kenneth denies he was precluded from finding, upon the identi- 
e\.el' consented to try the issue of abanddn- cal, unsupplemented record on remand, that 
rnent, expressly or implicitly. He argues the parties had in fact consented. We dis- 
that the magistrate's contrmy holding is un- agree. Xn remanding the case for additional 
by the record and must be re- findings, we merely observed our llmited role 
in reviewing factual issues. As explained by 
Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Rufes of Civil our. Supreme Court, 
p1-ocedur.e provides tha t  "where issues not The absence of findings and condusions 
rdised by the pleading are tl'kd by express may be disregarded by the appeHate caud 
or implied consent of the padies, they shall 07zJy where fie i s  and yieIds 
be treated in all respects as if t h q  had been & ~ o u s  anaver to Ule relevant ques- 
raised in the pleadings. . . . " 1.R.C.P. 15(5). tion. . , , Absent such chcumstances, the 
Although this specifies tbatWhen a thee- failure of the court to make findings 
of recovery is tried fuliy fry h e  parties the of fact and canc]nsions of law concerning 
tliai coud may base its decision on that the issues arising from the plead- 
theory and deem the pleadings amended ac" ings, upon which proof is offer&, ~ $ 1  ne- 
cordingb, an issue not by eith.)ler ex- cessihte a reversal of .the judgment and a 
press or implied consent cannot be the basis remand for additional findings and conclu- 
of the decision. M.K. Transport, Inc. u. sions,. , . 
Crouer, 101 Idaho 345, 612 P.2d 1192 (1980). ! : I !  t :  
Pope v. Internzoztntai?~ Gas Co., 103 Idaho 
[9-111 The determination whether an is- 217, 226, 646 P.2d 988, 996 11982! [empbads ! ! sue not raised by the pleadings was tried by arj8nal). : ! 
the implied consent of the parties involves a 
discretionary decision of the trial court, By declining to  decide on appeal whether 
t y ~ c h  v. Cheney, 98 Idaho 238, 561 P.2d 880 the parties had consented to try the issue of 
(1977); Mikesell v. Nezt.zuorld Den COT., 122 abandobrnent, we did not conclude that the 
idaho 868,840 P.Zd 1090 (Ct.App.1992). The record was inadequate to support a such 
exercise of discretion must be consistent with finding. Rather, we concluded only that the 
the due  process requirement, as conternplat- record did not yield an "obvious answel." to 
ecl by Rule 1B(b), that  the parties have suffi- this inherently factual question. According- 
cient notice of the issues before the court and ly, we remanded the case for the magistrate 
an opportunity to address those issues wjth to make the necessary determinations as the 
c;.idence and armment.  Ross v. Colenza~i trier of fact. 
rf). lac. 114 ~ d s i i o  817,761 P.2d 1169 (1988): - 
Yoyeover, L\-e naa caneiurle that the record 
K. Twasport. Ixe. 101 Idaho a t  349, 61.2 %*as sufficienUy to to both par- 
P.31 at 1196. Kotice of an issue is not . 
ties that the theory OF abandonment XTas p~tiibiished merely because evidence relevant 
before the court. In her triai brief, Carol 
to t h a t  issue was introduced; it must appear 
argued: 1)arties understood that the evidence was 
;kinictl a t  the unpieaded issue, no.ss, 113 neither party ever implemented the terms 
i( l ; i )~o a t  82Y, ,761 p . 3  1179; ;M.K Tvnlls- of the agreement by either deeding OK" 
o l i t i ,  I , ((: ,  201 Idaho at 349, 612 p.2d at 1196, assigning by bilf of sale or  appropriate 
H c ~ ~ c e ,  it is error for the  trial ~0ul.t  to base other docurnet~t an utxlivided one-half in- 
it..; [~ccision on an unpieaded issue tyhe3.e terest in the separate pl.opel-tg of each 
""thing in  the yecord indicates that the issue other [as required by the terms o f  the 
'rLi.c litigated at  tl.inf. M.X. ~m~ts j lo , j ,  ~ , t c . ,  agreement}. This brings into questian . . . 
[(Iaho at 849, 612 P.2d at  1196. was the agreement duly impiemehted or 
did the patties meretp agree to something 
i lz1 Kenneth avers that because this 
that. they nei'kr follolved through on until 
Cotlt+t in Liebtlt I held that "the zeeord does 
the time . clearly indicate &ether the parties in- 
. tended to abandon theb agreement," 118 
. I '  
125 IDAHO REPORTS 
:v*x. 
. . .  parties' community property which, absent a ,%; 
finding of "compelIing reasons," was in error, &#, A rescision [sic] or abandonment by con- 
See I.C. $ 32-712. W e  note, however, that in $${i. sen' be ' ~ ~ ' e d f i o ~  'he '''8 of the his findings and coneivsions tile rnagishak :@ 
parties 0.1. from inconsistelzt acts. . q r ~  expressly held that "the community propefiy ?+ 
Plaintiffs triai biief, at 6,  7 (emphasis add- of the parties should be allocated and diaded '?$: 
edf. 
implicitly tried by the parties. 
Dividing the parties' property. 
enforceability of the prenuptial apeement  from the magistpate's finding that, ijul.jng the 
nrere needed, and the possibility existed that period of  sepa,.ation, p-enneth had a 
the propetty ~ ~ u l d  have to be rediv5ded a s  a disposable income of $12.~4;~,34,  n.herea 
consequence of those findings. Thus, in re- Carol's net disposable income foIa the same 
agreement was unenforceable, and conse- awards be amended to take into account the : 
ing issues which coufd have becn, birr rvitich were outcome, on remand. 
LIEBELT v, LIEBELT 
Clte as 125 Idaho 302 [hpp.) 
disparity in those eernings. Denying Carol's proceedings on remand, We further hold 
request, the magistrate made clear that he that the magistrate did not err in finding 
did not intend to allocate the salaries. Rath- that the parties had abandoned their prenup- 
gr, the relevance of the finding concerning tial agreement, and that the magistrate did 
pior salaries was to demonstrate that Ken- not eM: in determining that such theory had 
nethls excesshe spendingmand not his lack been kied . ~ ~ c ~ s e  we conclude 
of income-had caused the community to in- that Kenneth has failed to demonstrate enor  
in the prope~%y division, we also uphold that 
cur a substantial indebtedness during the portion of the magistrate,s decree, Accord- 
parties' separation. The magistrate held *gly, we iffurn the decree of divorce. 
Kenneth solely responsible for this debt, be- 
cause Kenneth had incurred the debt in vio- Respondent, Carol Liebelt, is entitled to an 
lation of the court's earlier restraining order, award of her costs as provided in I.A.R. 40. . 
which required that Kenneth "refrain from NO attorney fees are awarded on appeal. 
inculTing any community debt during the 
pendency of this action." LANSING and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
e set out : 
itision of 
icier I.C. 
r s  set out 
.I( not be 
.~pon sub- 









; to derive 
during the 




~ t e  treated 







; property '' 
~ I C C O L I ~ ~  the 
I We have reviewed the property division 
and conclude that Kenneth has failed to dem- 
onstrate that it was not substantially equal. 
Accordingly, we will not disturb the magis- 
trate's division of the property in the divorce 
decree. 
Conclusion 
We conclude that the magistrate properly 
denied the motion to recuse himself in the 
395 (ci.dpp. .d 
r-c thc appcl- 
;,cal, but rhis f 
,ending addi- :s 
hc uncertain ::$. 
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Case No, CV-2003-240 
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PROCEEDINGS: At the outset thc Court heard oral argument from respective crrunsel regarding 
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Dated this ~ 6 ' ~  day of Aprll, 2007. 
a$w, 
DON L. HARDING 
District Judge 
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AitornevlstlPersonls~: Method of Sewice: 
Randall Kline 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Kenneth E. Lyon Jr, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Faxed to: 234-4654 
Faxed to: ' 232-8867 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN, Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, ) Case Nos. CV-2003-0000239 
CV-2003-0000240 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
VS. ) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 





VILARR RANSOM, as trustee of the Vitarr B. ) 










This matter is back before the Court oh Defendants' Motion to Disqualifj, filed on 
January 3,2007. This matter has been previously tried before this Court, and the Court's 
decision was appeaied. The ldaho Supreme Court vacated some of the Court's findings, 
Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., et al. Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Defendants' Motion to Disqualify 
MAY. 31.  2 0 0 7  1 0 : 0 2 A M  Jl'par HARDING 
reversed some, and remanded the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on 
the subject of the measure of damages for the trespass found by this Court. Ransom v. 
TopazMarketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641 (2006). After remand, Defendants moved to 
disqualify the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)'. Plaintiffs objected the motion, citing 
Liebelt v, tiebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (Ct,App, 1994) as authority to deny the motion because 
the case was not remanded for a new trial, merely for additional fmdings of ffao. This 
Courl agrees, and therefore denies the motion. 
A motion pursuant to LR,C.P. 40(d)(l)(F) may be filed by a party to disqualify 
the previously presiding judge after an order for a new trial, whether by order of the trial 
court or of an appellate court. The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does not order a 
new trial. It remands the case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the 
measure of damages for trespass. By the clear language of the rule, it does not apply to 
this case. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Liebelt. There, the 
Court held the rule did not apply when a case was remanded for additional findings of 
fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of Appeals held &at is not a "new trial" for operation 
of the rule. This case was also remanded for additional findings of fact, not for a new 
trial. In that regard this case and Liebelt are very sitnilar, and similar results should 
obtain, The Court will not grmt the motion to disqualify. 
In addition, judicial economy also justifies the denial of this motion, This Court 
has previously heard the evidence in this case and made the findings which are to be 
supplemented. This Court is in the best position to make those additional findings, A 
new judge will, be required to spend a significant amount of additional time to become 
familiar with the matter so as to make the additional findings required, and would be 
placed in the position of having to determine the justifioation for the award of damages 
granted by this Court without having the benefit of this Court's experience with the case. 
' No subsection of Rule 40(d)(l) was specified in the motion, howev'er, ~ivm the remand from the Idaho 
Supreme Court, it i s  assumed that subsection (F) is the applicable subseotion. 
Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., et 81. Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Defendants' Motlon to Disqusllfy 
MAY. 31. 2007 1 0 :  02AM JIln^"ARD1NG 
This Court is simply in the best position to make the additional findings of fact required 
by the Supreme Court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED for the forgoing 
reasons, Defendants' Motion to Disquala@ i s  DENIED, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
n 
DATED th is &day of May, 2007. 
District Judge f 
Farr West Inve$tments v. Topaz Marketing, LS., e l  81. Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Defendants' Motion to Disqualify at 
MAY. 31. 2007 10: 02AM Jl" ' HARDING NO. 554 P. 4 
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VILARR RANSOM, as trustee of the Vilan ) 










THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: 
This case having been remanded back to this Court from the Idaho Supreme Court on the 
issues of: 1) what damage was the natural effect of creating the easement and what damage was 
excessive, unnecessary and compensable under the law, and 2) the amount to be awarded for any 
permanent damages to the land determined by the difference of the fair market value before and 
afta the injury, or the amount to be awarded for temporaty injuries to the land, now comes 
before this Court, 
Far  West V, Topaz, Memorandum Recision and Order 
a3 
DEC. 5. 2 0 0 7  1 1  : 2 0 A M  J i ' ' *c  H A R O I N G  NO. 2 3 9  P .  2 
The first issue is addressed by looking at the injuries to the land including; erosion, cuts 
made by Defendant in the land outside of the granted easement, removal and deposit of soil to 
and &om Plaintiff's land, grading, cutting trees, placing gravel, removal of fences, and exceeding 
tbe scope of the easement. Damages to the property which are not compensable are the injuries 
which are a natural effect of creating or imptoving the easement. These include; grading, cutting 
trees, plming gravel and removal of obstructing fences within the easement. The Supreme Court 
has said that the easement may be modified according to the granted easement. Ransom v. Topaz 
MarkcetingL.P., 143 Idaho 641,645 (2006). Thus this Court will not award any damages directly 
caused by these actions. However where the modifications constitute an enlargement of the use 
or .an unreasonable increase in the burden of the easement on the subservient estate then the 
resulting injuries may be compensable. Abbott v. Nampa SchoolDist No, 131,119 Idaho 544 
(Idaho 1991). The Supreme Court in remanding this case has instructed how to compensate for 
excessive and unnecessary injuries. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 644-645. 
The injuries which are compensable because they are excessive and unnecessary we the 
permanent and temporary damages which do not naturally arise from the moditoations of the 
easement. These include the erosion snd sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land 
outside the easement and also the removal and deposit: of soil on Plaintiff's land and Defendants 
failure to install culverts or otherwise mitigate the altered and inmeased flow of water onto 
Plaintiff's land outside the easement. An example of this kind of injury to Plaintiff's land is 
found in the fact that 50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly graveled area and 
thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiff's land. The sloughing caused by the 
increase of water has rendered the land useless for building or cultivating. This is an 
Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
a4 
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unreasonable increase in 'the burden on the subservient estate and the Court feels that some 
damages should be awarded, 
The second issue deals with computation of the damages to be awarded and requires the 
Court to distinguish between temporary and permanent damages. This case is unique because 
there is an overlap of the permanent and temporary injuries to the land. An example ofthis is the 
sloughing which has occurred on the land. The sloughing has caused some of the fiIl dirt to be 
washed down stream and lost forever, however the sloughing may be remedied as indicated by 
the proposals of Biggs Enterprises. While the injuries to the land which ate continuing in nature 
and not abatable are permanent injuries, the eontiiued sloughing can be abated if the land is put 
back to its natural state. This makes the distinction of the damages difficult as it fits both 
categories to an extent. The Court feels that the loss of the soil due to the erosion is a permanent 
injury to the land as flar as that soil i s  unreooverable. This has also made the land impossible to 
farm as the loss of soil proves detrimental to the objective. The sloughing has made the land 
useless, kthermore the soil which has been lost and the pristine nature of the land has been lost 
forever. Thus the loss of soil is a permanent injury. 
The Supreme Court has instructed that the measure of these permanent damages be 
assessed by a computation of the fair market value of the land immediately prior to the injury 
and the fair market value of the land immediately following the injury. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 
645. The Plaintiffs have not proved any diminution of Me property value as a result of the 
permanent injuries to the land therefore this Court cannot award such damages. 
However, as mentioned above there are temporary injuries involved in this case as well, 
Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this case are the cuts made on Plaintiff's land 
outside of the easement, without permission, the heloughing and pooling caused by the cuts, and 
Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
2% 
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the removal and deposit of soil onto Plaintiffs land. According tc the estimate provided by Biggs, 
these can be restored to their natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling and 
measures can be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the land to its pre-injury 
state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in nature and can be compensated for by 
awarding tha amount necessary to restore the land to its condition prior to the injury. The 
Supreme Court has stated, "mf the cause of the injury is abatable or preventable and the injury 
capable of rectification by reasonable restoration, i.e., not exceeding the damage to the properly, 
the injury will be considered temporary and not permanent." Alesko v. Union Pacpc Rtailroad 
Go., 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can be rectified the damages are only 
temporary. In actions of temporary injury to land, the owner i s  entitled to recover amount 
necessary to repair injury and put land in condition it was at time immediately preceding injury. 
Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, (Ct.App. 1997) In regard to temporary injury .to property, if 
the cost of restoration exceeds the value ofthe premises in theti? original condition, or in the 
diminution in market value, the latter are the limits of recovery; however, because the goal of 
compensatory damages is reimbursement of the actual loss suffered, the rule precluding recovery 
in excess of the diminution in value is not of invariable application. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 
645, citing; Nampa &Meridian Irrtgation Dist., 139 Idaho 28 at 33-34 (2003). 
In this case because there is overlap ofthe permanent and temporary injuries this Court 
would award the amount submitted by Biggs Enterprises which estimated the cost of repair to be 
$42,685.00, This amount would remedy the temporary injuries and prevent any further 
permanent injuries to the land. However, it exceeds the value of the land because only 
approximately 7 acres were injured and the land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of 
$26,600.00, The bid also addresses problems of both apermanent and temporary nature as it 
Fan West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
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encompasses the filling of the cuts as well as remedying the loss of soil and continued sloughing. 
Plaintiff must prove the diminution of value in his property as a limit to compensatory damages 
for temporary damages as well as for permanent damages. Id. Plaintiff has failed to prove any. 
However, this seems be one of the very situations which the Supreme Court had anticipated 
when the standards of the application of the diminution value limit was relaxed under Numpa & 
Meridian Irrigation Rist . Id, 
The land in its current condition is not suitable to build on, nor is it capable of being 
cultivated. Despite the diminution of the land's value not being proved, the value of the land has 
been proved, Therefore, the Court will award that value in the mount of $26,600.00, While this 
amount mll not completely restore the Plaintips premises to their original condition, this 
amount will help put the Plaintiff's land back to the condition which it once was and make it 
useful again. Thus, it will remedy the temporary damages while abating any future sloughing 
damages and it is in harmony vith the parameters of the law and the Supreme Cowt's direction. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDOED that based upon the findings 
and law set forth by the Supreme Court and the facts of this case, the Cou*t hereby ftads that the 
Defendant did in fact injure the Plaintiff's land in excess of the modifications. The injury of soil 
loss to the Plaintiffs land was of a permanent nature in %at it caused water erosion that has 
\ 
rendered the property unsuitable for its natural use and is continuing in nature. The damages for 
the permanent injuries were not proved during the hearings and therefore the Court cannot award 
damages for the permanent injuries. Other injuries to the land resulting from Defendant's 
trespass are temporary in nature, Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for the excessive and 
unnecessary damages caused by cutting the ditches and the sloughing and pooling that has 
resulted from the easement across the Plaintiffs property, The proper measurement of these 
Far West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order a7 
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damages is the cost to restore the land to its pre-injury state. To do so would cost $42,685.00, but 
because this exceeds the value of the property, the Court will reduce the award to the estimated 
value, that being $26,600.00, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall pay this mount to Plaintiff with the 
statutory post judgment interest rate accruing from today, 
District Judge 
Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Deoision and Order 
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IT IS HEIUCBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this 
Court's Memora~?durn Decision dad Order in this case, dated December 5,2007, the 
Court hereby entors judgment in favor of Plainflff and awards them $26,600.00, 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Fsrr West v. Topaz, Judgment 
v 
District Judge 
DEC. 5 2007  1 l:21AM J i l "^c  H A R D I N G  
NO. 2 3 9  P. 9 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
VXLARR RANSOM, as trustee of the ) 
Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust 1 
) Case No. CV-03-239 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 
V S .  






FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, ) 




TOPAZ MARKETING, L. P . , ) 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER 1 
I 
Defendants. ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, by and through their attorney of 
record, Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr,, and pursuant to IRCP 11 ( a )  (2) (B), 
move the Court for reconsideration of that certain Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated December 5, 2007. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PAGE 1 
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A p r .  1. 2 0 0 8  1 : 3 6 P M  K e .  t h  E, L y o n  J r . ,  No .  1933 P. 3 
This motion is made upon the following grounds and for the 
following reasons: 
1. The property owned by Farr West, and which is the 
subject of this litigation, was sold after the appeal 
was filed. It is not know exactly when the sale took 
place, the value placed on the land, and only the 
Plaintiff's attorney has seen the sale documentation. 
This documentation and related information is relevant 
and crucial information in this case and should be made 
available to all parties before a finaldecision can be 
reached. 
2 ,  The Court erred in saying "only approximately 7 acres 
were injured." There was no testimony as to the amount 
of land injured. This is a question of fact yet to be 
determined. 
3. The Caurt erred in saying "the land is valued at $3,800 
per acre." The only testimony on value was by Mr. 
Geddes who estimated the land value at $50,000 per 
acre, and a real estate appraiser who testified the 
land had a value of $60'0 per acre. 
4. The temporary injuries alluded to in the Court's 
Decision are not a proper characterization of the 
alleged injuries. 
5. Farr West Investments has had two of its five members 
die since the appeal. Farr West Investments may no 
longer be the real party in interest. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERTlTION PAGE 2 
A p r .  1. 2008 1 : 3 7 P M  K e *  -!h E. L y o n  J r , ,  No .  1933 P.  4 
6. The Defendant, Dennis Lower, died on December 27, 2006. 
His estate is now a necessary party to this litigation. 
Therefore, and in light of the above, the Defendants ask the 
Court to reconsider the Memorandum Decision and Order dated 
December 5, 2007. Defendants request oral arguments be heard on 
this matter. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &% day of December, 2007, I served true and correct copies t e foregoing MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to the following as follows: 
F. Randall Kline 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 397 
Pocatello. ID 83204 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 8KTB JVDICXAL m'&TEPIPd0 6 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS j Case Nos. CV-03-0000239 CV-03-0000240 
Plaintiffs, ) 
VS. 1 
) MEMORANDUM DIECISION AND ORDER 
) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 







VILARR RANSOM, as .trustee of the Vilarr ) 
B, Ransom Revocable Trust, 1 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS . 1 
) 







MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: 
This case having been decided on December 5,2007, is back before the C o w  on the 
Defendant's Motionfor Reconsideration. A hearing was held on this motion on April 10,2007, 
whereupon the Court took thc matters under advisement. 
ISSUES TO BE DETIERMPNED: 
1. Whether the information regarding the sale ofthe land while the matter was on 
appeal and the documentation relating to the sale should have been made 
available to Defendants? 
Fur  West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
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2. Whether the Court erred in finding approximately 7 acres of land were injured? 
3.  Whether the Court erred in findimg the value ofthe land at %3,800.00 per acre? 
4- Whether temporary injuries are a proper characterization of the injuries? 
5 .  Whegher Farr West is still a real party in interest? 
6. Whetiher the estate of Dennis Lower i s  a necessary party to the litigation? 
The Defendant brings this motion based on Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) which states; 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of 
any order of the trial court made after entry of Anal judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no 
motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion 
filed under Rules SO(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59,1,60(a), or 60(b). 
RCP Rule 11 
When ruling on motions to reconsider the Court should act consistently with 
applicable legal standards, and xeach its decision through an exercise of reason. Curlee v. 
Kootenai Coundy Fire & Rescue, 2007 WL 1501383 % (Idaho App. 2007); see also 
CarneN v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322 (Idaho 2002). In making a 
determination on a motion for reconsideration the court may use evidence already before 
the court, and the briefs and &davits offered in support of the motion for 
reconsideration., Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812 (Idaho 2007) 
Rule 1 l(a)(2)(BiJ permits a party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under 
that rule, but does not require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson 
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, (Idaho App, 2006). 
DISCUSSION: 
F a r  West v. Topaz, Mamorandum Decision and Order 
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Defendant's Motion for Reconsidevation was filed on December 17,2007, 12 
days after the Court issued its' ~erno~andum Recision and Ovder. Therefore the motion 
is timely and pnoperly before the Court as per the terms of Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B). 
1, Whether the information regarding the sale of the land while the matter was 
on appeal, and the documentation relating to the sale should have been made 
available to Defendants? 
Defendant did not file a memorandum in support of their motion and no case law 
was given supporting this argument, This fact or objection was not raised during the 
proceedings of ;this case on remand from the Supreme Court, It is a hard thing to require 
the unknown from a pasty. Furthermore, the Court finds no such requirement of 
disclosure within the law. 
2. Wbetholr the Court erred in finding approximately 7 acres of land were 
INured? 
In this case the Court was acting as the fact finder, The Court had been on the 
disputed premises at tht: request of the parties and had personally observed the amount of 
damage to the property. There was ample evidence supporting the finding of the Court 
that approximately 7 acres of land had been injured. 
3. Whether the Court erred in finding thevalue of the land at %3,800.00 per 
acre? 
The evidence in this case supports the finding of the Court that the land is valued 
at approximately $3,800.00 per acre. The testimonies as to the value of the land were 
duly noted despite their vast disparities. The Court also utilized the market value 
evidence which was produced by the parties in document form. 
4. Whether temporary injuries are a proper characterization of the injuries? 
Fur West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
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In the Court's December 5,2007, Memorandum Decision and Order the Court states; 
Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this case are the cuts made on 
Plaintiffs land outside of the easement, without permission, the sloughing and 
pooling ;caused by the cuts, and the removal and deposit of soil onto Plaintiffs 
land. Aocording to the estimate provided by Biggs, these can be restored to their 
natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling and measures can 
be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the land to its pre- 
injury state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in nature and can be 
compensated for by awarding the amount necessary to restore the land to its 
condition prior to the injury. The Supreme Court has stated, "[Ilf the cause of the 
injury isiabatable or preventabfe and the injury capable of rectification by 
reasonable restoration, Le., not exceeding the damage to the property, the injury 
will be considered temporary and not permanent," Alesko v. Union PaciJic 
Railroad Co,, 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can be rectified 
the damages are only temporary. In actions of temporary injury to land, the owner 
is entitled to recover amount necessary to repair injury and put land in condition it 
was at tine immediately preceding injury. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 
(Ct.App. 1997). 
The Cowt charaaterized the injuries to the property according to the definitions 
found in case law, The Court found that the injuries were abatable because of the 
estimation conducted by Biggs which indicated the land could be restored and the 
sloughing stopped, These injuries were preventable and repairable and thus under the 
Alesko guidelines are categorized as temporary injuries. 
5, WhetheriFarr West is st% a real party in Merest? 
Defendants provide no legal support or new evidence which supports this olaim. 
The fact that some of the members of Farr West have passed on is of no legal 
oonsequence to this action, The outcome of the case would remain the same had all 
parties survived the action. 
6. Whether the Estate o f  Dennis Lower is a necessary party to the iitigzltkon? 
Farr West v, Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
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Defendants provide no legal support or new evidence which supports this claim, 
The fact that Mr. Lower has passed on is of no legal consequence of to this action, The 
outcome of the.case would remain the same had all parties survived rhe action. The 
effects of the Courts decisions may be felt by the Estate of Dennis Lower however there 
is no legal need to include them in matters which were already in progress, 
CONCLUSIOR 
For the foregoing reasons IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED WWD 
ADJUDGED that based upon the findings of law and facts of this case, the Defendant's Motion 
for Reconsideration is IDEMED. 
IT IS SO ORDIEREID. 
Dated this .$- % ay of June, 2008. 
L 2.- 
Don L. Barding 
District Judge 
Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
JUN. 5. 2008 2: 38PM Jl lPnc HARDING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5 day of June, 2008 I served a true copy of the foregoing 
document on the attomey(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with correct postage thereon, by 
f~sirnile, or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Attomey(s)/Person(s): Method of Service: 
KENNETH E. LYON JR, 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 4866 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
Tel: (205) 233.1240 
Fax: (208) 232.88676109 
F RANDALL KLW 
F. RANDALL KLNE CEARTERED 
427 N, Main Stteat, STE. L 
P,O. Box 397 
PocateUo, Idaho 83204-0397 
Tel: (208) 232-9007 
Fax: (208) 234-4654 
Hand Delivered 
By U.S,Mail 









Clerk of the District Court 
BY , Deputy Clerk 
Farr West v. Topaz, Memorandum Decision and Order 
qa 
KENNETH E. LYON, JR. 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 4866 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
(208) 233-1240 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
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r CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
VILARR RANSOM, as trustee of the ) 
Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust ) 
) Case No. CV-03-239 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 1 
) 
vs . ) Supreme Court No. 
) 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and, ) 




FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, ) 
) Case No. CV-03-240 
plaintiff /Respondent, ) 
) 
vs . 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L. P. , and ) 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER ) 
) 
Defendants/Appellant. ) 
TO: Ttie above-named Plainti£f/Respondent, VILARR RANSOM, as 
trustee of the Vilarr B. Ransom Revocable Trust, and their 
attorney, F. Randall Kline, and Plaintiff/Respondent, FARR WEST 
INVESTMENTS, and their attorney, F. Randall Kline, and V. Elliott 
Larsen, Clerk of the above-entitled Court: 
PAGE 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I. 
The above-named Appellants, Topaz Marketing, L. P., and Mrs. 
Lower, through her attorney of record, Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr., 
appeal against, Farr West Investments the above-named Respondent, 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Disqualify, dated May 30, 2007 and 
the Motion to Reconsider dated June 5, 2008; and to the failure to 
abide by the ruling of the Supreme Court in a prior appeal of this 
case; all of these alleged errors were made by the Honorable Don 
L. Harding, District Judge. 
11. 
Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, and the order described in Paragraph I above is an 
appealable order under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
111. 
The Issues to be appealed are: 
1. Whether the Court erred in denying the Appellant's 
Motion to Disqualify the Judge after this case was remanded to 
the above Court pursuant to the decision found in Volume 143 Id. 
641. 
2. Whether the court improperly measured actual damages by 
failing to assess and distinguish between costs to repair 
PAGE 2 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
temporary damage to the property and permanent damage to the 
property. 
3. Whether the court improperly measured damages in 
failing to distinguish between damages attributable to Lower's 
permissible trespass to create or maintain an access road and 
damages attributable to excessive intrusion exceeding the scope 
of the easement. 
4, Whether the Court improperly measured actual damages. 
5. Whether the Court erred in denying Appellant's Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
IV. 
Appellants request preparation of the reporter's transcript 
as defined in Rule 25, Idaho Appellate Rules, for the hearing to 
Disqualify held April 26, 2007, and the motion to reconsider held 
April 10, 2008. 
v .  
Appellants request the following documents to be included in 
the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
1. Motion to Disqualify, dated January 3, 2007. 
2. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendants' 
Motion to Disqualify, dated May 30, 2007. 
3. Memorandum Decision and Order, dated December 5, 2007. 
PAGE 3 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
4. Motion for Reconsideration, dated December 17, 2007. 
5. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant' Motion 
to Reconsider, dated June 5, 2008. 
I certiiy this notice of appeal was properly mailed in the 
United States Mail with postage prepaid to all of the parties 
required to. be served pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellant Rules, 
and further certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the reporter 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record has been paid. 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2008 
PAGE 4 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 9th day of July, 2008, 1 mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the 
following by placing the same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid 
thereon: 
F. Randall Kline 
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED 
P.0 Box 397 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
District Judge 
Caribou County Courthouse 
159 South Main Street 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Honorable Don L.  Harding 
District Judge 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W Oneida 
Preston. ID 83263 
Dorothy Snarr 
Court Reporter 
159 South Main Street 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Clerk of the Court 
Franklin County Courthouse 
39 W Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DlSTRl DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, I Supreme Court No. 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
Case number from court: CV-2003-240 
Order or judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify dated May 30, 
2007 and Motion to Reconsider dated June 5, 
2008 
Attorney for Appellant: Kenneth E. Lyon 
Attorney for Respondent: F. Randall Kline 
Appeal by: Defendant 
Appeal against: Plaintiff 
Notice of Appeal filed: July 10, 2008 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: NO 
Was reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr 
Dated this 15" day of July, 2008 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
'~.finda Hampton, ~ e p u t j  Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR 
0. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST, 
PlaintifftRespondent, 
vs 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
DENNIS LOWER, 
DefendantsIAppellants. 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 35494 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
1 ,  V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the following is a 
list of exhibits which were offered or admitted into evidence during the hearing in this 
cause: 
NONE 
1N WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 22"d day of August, 2008. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT - 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
* * * * * *  
VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR 
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
DENNIS LOWER. SUPREME COURT NO. 35494 
DefendantslAppeIlants. I 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, I 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER, 
I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and 
correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be 
duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and 
Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Preston, Idaho, this 22" day of August, 2008. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
VILAAR RANSOM, as trustee of the VILARR 
B. RANSOM REVOCABLE TRUST, 
PlaintiffIRespondent, 
VS 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
DENNIS LOWER, 
DefendantsIAppellants. 1 
SUPREME COURT NO. 35494 
FARR WEST INVESTMENTS, CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
PlaintifflRespondent, I 
TOPAZ MARKETING, L.P., and 
MR. AND MRS. DENNIS LOWER, 
DefendantslAppellants. I 
I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United Stakes Mail, 
one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record 
in this cause as follows: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 4866 
Pocatello, ID 83205 
F. Randall Kline 
F. RANDALL KLINE CHARTERED 
PO Box 397 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0397 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
B 
